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ROBERT AUDIt
The philosophical theory of action is important for the law in
many ways. There are difficult questions about what constitutes
human action-the chief focus of both the analytical efforts of action
theory and the regulatory efforts of the law. There is the perennial
problem of characterizing freedom of action, with its related
difficulties in classifying and appraising impairments of freedom.
And with respect to both the conceptualization of action and the
theory of punishment, there are questions about the nature of
intention, deliberateness, premeditation, and other notions that are
important for understanding and judging actions.
Michael Moore's Act and Crime' is a major contribution to this
important and growing area of intersection between philosophy and
legal theory. The book develops a theory of action in the light of
a fine-grained survey of contemporary philosophy of action; it
explores legal notions, such as those of an act, of intent, and of
liability, in relation to both philosophical and legal literature; and
it brings various elements in the theory to bear on a number of
important problems in the law. The book is especially noteworthy
for its wide-ranging analysis of significant positions in the literature;
here, it performs a valuable service not only for legal theorists but
for philosophers as well. It is among the most comprehensive and
sophisticated treatises in the philosophy of action to appear in many
years.
This Article will attempt three tasks: (1) to explicate key
elements in an important part of Moore's theory, namely, its use of
the notion of volition; (2) to appraise that part of the theory and, in
the light of the appraisal, to offer an alternative approach to the
same problems; and (3) to indicate how the resulting conception of
action is significant for some aspects of moral responsibility and the
law.
t" Professor of Philosophy, University of Nebraska, Lincoln. This Article has
benefitted from comments by Robert F. Schopp and from discussions with my fellow
symposium participants at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
'MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993).
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I. VOLITION AND INTENTION
I address the theory of volition and its place in the wider theory
of action in the context of a causal conception of human action and
its explanation. Specifically, I assume that actions are caused by
psychological elements in the agent, that these elements provide the
materials for explaining the actions they cause, and that such
causation may be, though it need not be, nomic, in the sense that
there are laws, universal or statistical, linking the elements to the
actions they explain. These assumptions are controversial, but I
have defended them elsewhere.2 They are points which, even if I
am mistaken in thinking that Moore would accept them in some
form, will not affect the discussion to follow. It is particularly
important to consider volition in the context of a causal theory of
action. The interest in volition seems to lie primarily in its promise
of providing a kind of causal ground of action that roots actions in
the agent in just the way appropriate to the kinds of behaviors that
are paradigms of the sorts of actions the law seeks to regulate or,
when necessary, to punish.
One difficulty in approaching the topic of volition is that there
is little we may presuppose in the way of a pretheoretical character-
ization. We might say, in line with both philosophical tradition and
common speech, that volitions are acts of will; but no plausible
volitional theory-which I shall call "volitionalism" for short-posits
a substantive will as a kind of agent capable of its own acts.3 If
volitions are acts of any kind, as opposed to events that underlie
acts, they are acts of an agent in the ordinary sense of the term
"agent" as applicable to persons.
Moore is well aware of these difficulties, and he rejects the
problematic view that basic action simply is volition,4 which implies
that the overt physical deeds we call actions are not basic but are
volitional acts under a behavioral description. Working within the
constraints of what he terms the "mental-cause thesis," he proposes
2See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, The Concept of Wanting, in ACTION, INTENTION, AND
REASON 35 (1993) [hereinafter AUDI, Wanting]; ROBERT AUDI, Acting for Reasons,
in ACTION, INTENTION, AND REASON, supra, at 145 [hereinafter AUDI, Acting for
Reasons].
S This would, of course, raise the question whether another layer of volitions
would be needed to account for volitional acts.
4 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 95-108.
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"to take 'volition' to name a species of intention."' The broad
conception he arrives at deserves full statement:
Happily we have no need to resort to a fourth kind of mental
state in order to think of volitions, for bare intentions fit the bill
nicely. As we shall see, in order to execute even simple practical
syllogisms, in order to resolve conflicts between our desires and
between our beliefs, in order to account for the phenomenon
known as weakness of will, and in order to save us from being
'Sartrean persons' (where everything is always up for grabs at all
times), there must be states of bare intention. Such states execute
our background motivational and cognitive states into actions, do
so even when our desires or beliefs are in conflict, account for our
failures to execute such beliefs or desires (as in cases of akrasia, or
weakness of will), and project our resolutions in these matters into
the future so that we need not redecide such matters again and
again. Volitions fit into this executory role of bare intentions very
neatly, for they are simply such bare intentions having as their
objects the simplest bits of bodily motion that we know how to do.
Volitions are simply the last executors both of our more general
intentions and of the background states of desire and belief that
those more general intentions themselves execute.6
This conception is developed by Moore both in the course of
answering various objections to volitionalism and in his develop-
ment of a positive characterization of volition. Among the more
important objections are (1) the claim (which Moore takes to be
implicit in theses of Michael Bratman's) that, unlike intentions,
volitions can be directed toward actions which one does not take to
be possible,' (2) the view that, as intermediate causes, volitions are
ripe candidates for elimination,9 and (3) the psychological conten-
tion that we do not experience all the willing we should experience
if volition, conceived as a kind of willing, plays the pervasive role in
action that Moore assigns to it.10
Let us start with the rationality objection. To Bratman's conten-
tion that intentions must satisfy rationality constraints that volitions
do not, Moore replies that not all intentions satisfy the constraints
5 d. at 120.
6 Id. at 121.
'See id. at 122-23; see also MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND
PRACTICAL REASON 113-19, 130-35 (1987).
8 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 122.
1 See id. at 123-24.
10 See id. at 129.
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in question: "I can intend to hit a target even though I know I can't
hit it; and I can rationally intend to hit target 1 and intend to hit
target 2, even though I do not intend to hit both targets 1 and
2."" As for the worry that volitions, as intermediate causes, are
needless posits-which I shall call the eliminability objection-Moore
responds, in part, that "it is largely the inability of states of belief
and desire to rationalize our acts that lead[s] us to posit the
executory state of volition." 2 And to the objection that we are
insufficiently conscious of volitions to warrant giving them the
pervasive role volitionalism assigns to them-which I shall call the
phenomenological objection-Moore replies that while "[u]ndeniably we
learn to string together various of our bodily movements into
complex routines with such dexterity that, once we have mastered
the routine, we can literally not pay attention to what we are doing
(at the level of bodily movements)."" Still, given
that we seek phenomenal clues to the nature of those mental states
that execute desires into action, a good place to look for such
clues is at the mental states we had to acquire in order to acquire
our various skills of action. The objects of those states were bodily
motions. It is a reasonable (although far from inevitable)
hypothesis that those same states exist to cause those same
motions when they occur later in life as part of speaking or
playing, even though awareness of those states has receded.'4
In laying out a positive case for volitionalism, Moore makes a
number of points, only some of which I propose to consider. A
central one is
that the basic thing that gives rise to the inference (that there must
be volitions) is the existence of human actions as a natural kind.
Our sense has long been that 'something' is indeed 'left over' if we
subtract the fact that our arm rises from the fact that we raised
our arm, to paraphrase Wittgenstein's famous observation.'
5
If we call the problem Wittgenstein articulated the subtraction
problem, then the point here is, in part, that this problem is not
soluble without positing volitions as the crucial differentia distin-
guishing action from bodily movement. 6
" Id. at 123.
12 Id. at 124.
Is Id. at 129.
14 Id. at 129-30.
"5 d. at 134 (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 621
(3d ed. 1958)).
16 Moore does not neglect to consider mental movements, such as the spontaneous
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A second central point is that we cannot account for the nature
of practical reasoning without positing volition as its concluding
element. Specifically, "we must conceptualize this concluding
propositional attitude as a bare intention, not as a belief (say, that
one will go downtown) and not as a desire (say, to go down-
town)." 7  One might think that motivating desires, means-end
beliefs, and desires to perform the action would suffice. But that
hypothesis will not do. "The problem with this attempt to conceptu-
alize concluding propositional attitudes as being the strongest
competing prima-facie desires to do an act is that it leaves out the
resolving function of such concluding propositional attitudes when
there is (as there always is) conflict." 8 These two points are
developed and defended in later sections of the book," but there
is one more issue that should be noted before beginning an assess-
ment of Moore's case for volitionalism.
It is well known that any causal theory of action must reckon
with deviant causal chains-that is, strange, wayward sequences
running from desires and beliefs of the kind that usually produce
intentional action, but do not do so in the case in question because
of the way in which they cause the relevant bodily (or, in principle,
mental) motion. A machine, for instance, might cause my arm to
go up just as it would have if I were signaling a question in a
lecture, but only because my relevant desires and beliefs triggered
the machine's manipulations, and not because I in any sense willed
to raise my hand. I might thus be surprised at the way my arm
rises; even if it does so at the right time and is what I was motivated
to bring about (in order to ask my question), I may not feel that I
am moving it, or at least may not feel that I am moving it in the
normal way. Moore rejects the idea that we should rule out these
chains by, say, making the content of intention rich enough to
occurrence of an image, as contrasted with calling that same image to mind. But it
seems odd that, along with Donald Davidson, whom he quotes to this effect, Moore
seems willing to conceive bodily movement as encompassing mental acts like deciding
and computing, or at least as encompassing mental states, if the latter can be willed.
See id. at 82 (citing DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 49 (1980)).
I do not see why countenancing an action-movement distinction in the mental realm
is necessarily a problem for the kind of theory Moore is developing. The analysis of
action must, to be sure, be broader than one reducing it to willed bodily movement;
but there would appear to be a gain at least in providing a definite place for what is
commonly and plausibly conceived as mental action.
17 Id. at 138.
11 Id. at 140.
19 See id. at 149-55.
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specify the (or a) right way to raise one's hand.2 ' Rather, he
prefers
to keep the object of volitions simple-that one's arm rises, for
example-but adjust the causal requirement for action (that a
volition cause a movement [of the sort characteristic of the action,
as a hand's moving is characteristic of one's moving the hand]) by
saying that volitions must directly (or proximately) cause such
movements.
... [A]s lawyers well know, some notion of 'proximateness' is
required whenever we refer to causation, so there is no special
problem in using such a notion as part of one's criteria for
action.
21
II. VOLITION, MOTIVATION, AND THE DYNAMICS OF ACTION
Before beginning an appraisal of Moore's volitionalism, let me
emphasize some of its important elements. First, Moore rightly
stresses that volitions have an executory role in action.22 This is an
appropriate emphasis, particularly if we speak of volitions in the
context of a causal account of action, for beliefs and desires-
indeed, even intentions as they are very commonly conceived-are
dispositional states, in a sense entailing that they can exist without
undergoing or producing any change. Like the brittleness of glass,
beliefs, desires, and intentions can be present for indefinite periods
without having any effects. In order to have their characteristic
effects in action, such as producing behavior aimed at fulfilling an
intention, these intentional states must be triggered by an appropri-
ate event-an elicitor, we might say. Volitions, as-roughly speaking-
"acts" of will, can play this triggering, hence causally executory, role.
Second, such a role is also needed, in Moore's view, to provide
mediation between the beliefs, desires, and other dispositional
elements figuring in the premises of practical reasoning on the one
hand and, on the other hand, the action in which practical reason-
ing issues. 2' Third, Moore sees conflict as a pervasive element in
our desire and belief systems. Action cannot occur without
resolution of such conflicts; volition here plays the role of reconcil-
er, or, at least, of referee.
20 See id. at 159.
21 Id. at 159-60 (citations omitted).
' See id. at 149.
2- See id. at 121.
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Let us start with Moore's response to some significant problems
for volitionalism. On the matter of the rationality objection, I
would note that Moore may go further than he needs to go. The
view to be addressed is not, I think, that intending to perform an
action, A, is inconsistent with a belief that one cannot A-which
seems an immensely plausible view-but the thesis that intending to
A is inconsistent with a belief to the effect that one will probably fail
to A. This thesis is plausible both intuitively, in its own terms, and
because, as "practical" attitudes that we presuppose in planning,
intentions do not attach to what we take to be unlikely.24 Planning
on the basis of what we think less than likely (as opposed to
preparing oneself in case it should happen) is not the main strategy
of rational agents, if it is a strategy of theirs at all. The same might
be said even of planning without believing something positive, say
something at least as strong as that the action in question is likely
to achieve one's end. Thus, I can plan to reach New York by
nightfall because I intend to take an afternoon train that I know is
scheduled to arrive by then, and I believe, partly in virtue of having
this intention, that I will take that train. I do not plan on the basis
of a belief that I may well miss the train, which I think unlikely. If
I believe that I will likely miss the train, I will only hope to catch it,
and only hope, but not plan (unconditionally), to reach New York
by nightfall. We can, however, act in desperate hope, especially
where we know that failure will be disastrous, and here volition is
plausibly thought to be required or, at least, likely. What Moore
could say, then, is that while long-range, future-directed intentions, the
kind most important in planning, must meet the relevant belief
condition, bare intentions, the kind plausibly identified with volition,
need not.
I might also suggest that intention is only one candidate to
constitute volition, and since volition must in any case be explicated,
Moore could redescribe volition with minimal theoretical cost. He
would not in that case have a "reductive" account of volition, but
24 For a case on the intuitive point, see ROBERT AUDI, Intending, in ACTION,
INTENTION, AND REASON, supra note 2, at 56, 57-58 [hereinafter AUDI, Intending].
For a discussion of the role in planning, see BRATMAN, supra note 7, at 14-49. See
also Robert Audi, Intention, Cognitive Commitment, and Planning, 86 SYNTHESE
361, 370-72 (1991). I should add, however, that in saying this I do not mean to
imply-what is surely false-that one cannot act intentionally when one does something
in order to achieve an end one merely hopes, but does not intend, to achieve thereby.
This is important for moral responsibility and law insofar as an action's not being
intentional might reduce responsibility for it, or bear on the character of the agent.
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this would be of limited theoretical cost because he would not need
any new raw materials beyond those he uses. Indeed, in one way,
he would gain. As normally understood, volitions are events in the
usual sense in which events happen and the occurrence of an event
at a time entails that of a change at this time. This is in fact how
volitions must be understood if they are to play the dynamic,
triggering role Moore and other causal theorists have in mind for
them. But it is questionable whether intentions are ever events; for
one thing, they do not happen. Their formation is an event; their
manifestations, especially in speech and action, are events; their
effects on practical reasoning are events. But to intend is to be in
a kind of state, even if momentarily; it is not to be doing or
undergoing something.25 I am inclined to believe, then, that to
call volitions intentions is to use "intention" in a technical sense and
that, far from making the notion of volition more familiar, this
makes both volition and intention seem less so.
A positive suggestion that might be incorporated into the main
points of Moore's theory of action is that volitions should be taken
to be a kind of trying, as they indeed have been taken to be by
various action theorists. 6 Not only is trying an event (on some
views, because it is an act of some sort), it is also like intending in
being intentional (having an intentional object), and, on at least one
point, it seems to serve Moore's purpose better than intending. It
is possible to try to do something one believes is very unlikely; and
it is, I think, more plausible to claim that one can try to do what
one thinks is impossible than to claim that one can intend to do
this. Here, trying would involve not intention to achieve the result,
but "hoping against hope" that one would succeed. I suspect that
insofar as one is really trying to do something, and not simply doing
something that would ordinarily be called trying to do it, or making
a try at it, one has ceased to believe, if one did, that it is impossible.
Consider a small elderly man pushing against a heavy truck on level
ground. Perhaps he can "make a try at" rolling it, while believing
success impossible; but even if this is so, it is doubtful that he can
be said to be really trying to roll it, as opposed to pushing against
25 See AUDI, Intending, supra note 24, at 57-66; ROBERT AUDI, Volition and
Agency, in ACTION, INTENTION, AND REASON, supra note 2, at 94-95 [hereinafter
AUDI, Volition] (defending, though largely indirectly, the view that intentions are not
events).
26 See AUDI, Volition, supra note 25, at 76-77 (citing these action theorists and
discussing their views of volition).
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it, if he believes (and has not temporarily forgotten) that his moving
it is impossible. Whatever conclusion one draws on this issue,
however, it is only the possibility of trying to do what one believes
very unlikely that Moore would need to exploit here if trying is to
play the role in his theory that is played by volition as he under-
stands it.
Moore's other main point concerning rationality seems plausible
to me. Propositional attitudes (of which believing, wanting, and
intending are paradigms) are not in general conjunctive. It is, for
instance, quite possible to believe p and also believe q without
having a single belief that p and q. That is, having a conjunction of
beliefs does not entail having a single belief with conjunctive
content consisting of the propositional object of the first belief and
that of the second. One can believe that one is eating ice cream,
and also believe that one is gaining weight, without believing, at the
time, that one is eating ice cream and is gaining weight. The
burden of showing that intentions, even in most cases, are conjunc-
tive is heavy. Granted, if I am rational and actions A and B, which
I separately intend, are in some significant way related, I will, under
certain conditions, form the single intention to do both.
Consider cases in which (a) I am asked whether I intend both A
and B, and I thus get both before my mind at the same time or,
more important, (b) it is obvious that I cannot do one without doing
the other, as with paying a bill by mail and writing a check or a
charge authorization. Here I may form a conjunctive intention,
rather than simply retaining or forming two related intentions. But
once we see how difficult it is to formulate sound conjunction
conditions for intentions in general and how easily a conjunction of
intentions may exist without yielding a conjunctive intention, there
is at least less reason for special worries about accounting for the
degree of conjunctivity of volition. Indeed, as my examples suggest,
conjunction is to be expected above all when there is some occasion
to get the two objects of the propositional attitude in question
before the mind at once, and this is less likely with a momentary
state than with a long-term one, such as an intention to pay a bill or
to educate one's children.
27
27 Here and elsewhere, I presuppose distinction between a dispositional intention-
the usual case of intention as opposed to the case in which the intended action is
before one's mind and the intention is in that sense "occurrent"-and a disposition
to intend-a state of readiness to form an intention given an appropriate stimulus.
I am disposed to intend, but do not ordinarily intend, to step over a strip of grass
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Regarding the eliminability objection, Moore may well be right
in suggesting that the basic ground for positing volitions is to
distinguish actions from bodily movements." I think there is no
doubt that volitions can play this role, and in roughly the way he
suggests. What I miss is a case that rules out the best competing
candidates to play the role. He does argue, persuasively I think,
that desires and beliefs cannot play this role.2 9 As I would put it,
we need genuine events to serve as the dynamic, causal elements
required to explain how such dispositional states as desires, beliefs,
and long-term intentions are realized. In presenting my own sketch
of an account of the dynamics of action, I will suggest what seem to
me to be the most promising nonvolitional candidates for this causal
role.
3 0
This brings us to the phenomenological objection. I would
certainly agree that the phenomenology of learning is an important
area of investigation for the topic of volition, as for other topics in
action theory, and Moore is among a relatively small number of
theorists to take it seriously. But he seems to put too much stress
on the hypothesis that the states necessary in learning to perform
certain actions continue to "exist to cause those same motions when
they occur later in life.""1 A shovel may be needed to drain a
waterlogged yard, but once the trenches are dug, the water flows
naturally through them. Habits may be similar. Indeed, one would
think that the notion of a habit is, in part, defined by an ability to
do the relevant kind of thing without any more than a cue indicat-
ing its appropriateness, and much of our behavior is habitual. And
while skill is defined mainly in terms of behavioral results, it may be
a subsidiary element in the concept that an exercise of a skill
bypasses much of the initial monitoring required to learn it. I
would be, at best, eccentric if I were able to play a sonata only by
going through the self-promptings needed to learn it. Quite apart
from all this, however, is there not still a problem: does our
that I routinely cross when leaving my parking lot (it is not lawn and no particular
consideration is called for). Still, on finding dampness on the grass, I will consider
whether to go over it and (normally) form the intention to do so, if it is not muddy.
For a theoretical account and defense of the distinction between dispositional
attitudes and dispositions to form them, see Robert Audi, Dispositional Beliefs
and Dispositions to Believe, 28 NOOS (forthcoming Mar. 1995).
28 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 87.
21 See id. at 137-49.
" See infra part III.
s1 MOORE, supra note 1, at 129-30.
1994] VOLITION, INTENTION, AND RESPONSIBILITY
experience of action contain even a modicum of what it should
contain if we are experiencing (or engaging in) volition?
This question is even more difficult than it appears. For one
thing, if we focus on our actions, we become self-conscious, and
what we experience is then not representative. Indeed, self-
prompting should be expected to be necessary more often where
self-consciousness reduces our concentration on the action than
where we simply perform it in the normal course of events. Think
of driving in difficult road conditions, or of listening to oneself
speak instead of simply tracking the point one is making. For
another thing, intention and-if it is different-volition are what we
might call reflection-sensitive attitudes (or events). We tend to form
them when, in a context where they are appropriate, we reflect on
certain things, especially on whether we have them or on their
would-be objects, that is, on what their objects will be if we form
them, such as an attractive course of action or an obviously true
proposition. When I go to a concert, I may have no intention to
break my last twenty-dollar bill in paying; but, if someone asks me
whether I intend to do this-or if I ask myself whether I must do it-
against the background of my recollection of what cash I have and
of my knowledge that I will need the bill to pay, I may form the
intention to break it. And if, as I am slicing meat, I am on
automatic pilot but am asked whether, or I ask myself whether, I am
trying 2 to slice it thin, I may then start to "will" to keep the knife
so directed and may become conscious of an effort of self-direction
in moving my hand to keep the slices thin. Thus, even if we find
volition in many of the cases in which we might naturally look for
it, we cannot conclude that it is not often a product of our search,
any more than one can conclude from the readiness with which I
would agree that I am not now puffing two Cuban cigars, that,
before the subject came up, I already believed this proposition. If
I did, I would presumably have been retrieving it from memory; in
fact, I had to dream it up.
So far, I have been taking the pervasiveness of volition to be an
empirical question. But while Moore and other volitionalists are
concerned to show that volitions are precisely as common as they
should be, given their role in action theory, many also seem to think
that, at least insofar as we can distinguish conceptual from empirical
32 Trying, particularly of this self-conscious sort, is the kind often identified with
volition.
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questions, the presence of volition in the genesis of intentional
action is verifiable conceptually by a proper analysis of the notion
of action."3 To understand what action, as opposed to movement,
is is in part to see the relevance of volition in the genesis of the
former. Indeed, on one kind of volitionalist view, the kind held by
H.A. Prichard, volition is basic action; 4 physical action is simply
volition under an appropriate physical description. To parody
Donald Davidson, this view claims that all we ever do is move our
wills; the rest is up to nature.3" My view, to be explained shortly,
is that however pervasive volition is in the performance of actions,
the concept of volition, important as it may be in a complete picture
of human action, is apparently not a necessary element in the
analysis of the concept of action.36
Let us now turn to the positive role of volitions in relation to
practical reasoning. Here Moore seems to have two main points.
One, concerning the dynamics of action, has already been intro-
duced, but it has special application to action based on practical
reasoning, at least insofar as such action occurs "straightaway" upon
the agent's concluding the reasoning. As Moore puts it, "Aristotle's
notion that action follows 'straight away' from a belief-desire set
seems to leave something out: don't I have to form some proposi-
tional attitude having as its contents that I go into the barber's
shop, before I do that act?"3 7 If we conceptualize the "concluding
[element] as a bare intention," the problem is solved.3"
Moore's second point in relation to practical reasoning seems to
be that volitions are needed in a kind of refereeing role that cannot
be played by beliefs and desires, for to posit just the latter two kinds
of elements in connection with the conclusion of practical reasoning
"leaves out the resolving function of such concluding propositional
33 See, e.g., RAIMO TUOMELA, HUMAN ACTION AND ITS EXPLANATION 141-42
(1977) (describing volitions as antecedents of action tokens).
34 See H.A. PRICHARD, MORAL OBLIGATION 193 (Oxford Univ. Press 1968) (1949)
(stating that "[a]n action.., is an activity of willing some change").
3s See DONALD DAVIDSON, Intending, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 83, 89-
91 (1980) (arguing that "action is forming an intention").
6 See infra part III.
37 MOORE, supra note 1, at 137-38.
38 Id. at 138. 1 note in passing that the view attributed to Aristotle is not clearly
found in his work; he seems, in fact, to imagine something like "choice," which is at
least close to volition, as playingjust the sort of role Moore imagines. For a detailed
discussion of Aristotle on this point, see ROBERT AUDI, PRACTICAL REASONING 32-36
(1989) (discussing Aristotle's views on the structure of action).
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attitudes when there is (as there always is) conflict." 9 Volition-as
bare intention whose direction is the action in favor of which the
reasoning concludes-plays this role.
I agree that resolution may be needed before an agent who has
conflicting propositional attitudes can act. But I do not see that
positing volition here solves the problem. Let us begin with a
distinction. Moore's claim that there is always conflict is plausible
if applied to contentual conflict: the kind that holds between logically
or probabilistically incompatible beliefs (where the incompatibility
is strictly between their propositional objects) or between desires
whose objects cannot be jointly realized, such as wanting to go to
Scotland for a few days and wanting to go to France for the same
days. In normal persons there will be conflicting desires in this
sense, for example desires to have teenage children free and
independent and to have them obedient. But this objective conflict,
grounded in relations between the contents of propositional
attitudes, is normally not relevant to more than a relatively narrow
(if significant) range of one's actions, especially if one has a roughly
hierarchized set of major goals. It is episodic conflict-the subjective
kind that occurs when one faces a choice between satisfying one or
the other of two about equally strong conflicting desires-that
normally needs resolution before action on one of the conflicting
desires is possible. Here we have not mere behavioral tendencies
going in different directions yet not actually competing for
dominance, but head-to-head conflict. How does positing volitions
help to explain the needed resolution?
Even granting that the formation of a volition favoring one of
the desires, and hence one of the incompatible actions, must be
formed in order for the agent to pursue that action over the other,
why is this volition formed? Do we not need an explanation of that,
since we are not taking the will to be arbitrary but instead rooted in
the person's overall character? And is the explanation not likely to
be in terms of, for instance, one desire's gaining the ascendancy
over a competitor because it becomes aligned with a third, say a
desire to lend the teenager a car, formed because one believes that
this action will serve both to nurture independence and to preserve
obedience by making one's restrictive policies seem less burden-
some? In this resolution, it is often the occurrence of thought
which, in part by generating beliefs, resolves the conflict. I have
39 MOORE, supra note 1, at 140.
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already suggested thinking of a new consideration leading to the
formation of an ally for one of the conflicting desires; one might
also think of a compromise and thereby form a new desire stronger
than any of the competing ones. Volition seems more a product of
such resolutions than their creator.
We can grant, then, the executory role of volition Moore posits,
so long as we take it to be a causal role relative to getting disposi-
tional states to yield action, a sort of triggering role. But this role
does not suffice to explain the needed reconciliation; there are the
same kinds of questions about why one desire is triggered as about
why it prevails over an episodic competitor in the first place. We
cannot explain why one of two desires prevailed in action by saying
that it led to a volition; rather, it seems, the same factors that
explain why it prevails are likely to be crucial in explaining why it
led to a volition. If volition is really basic action, this is obviously
to be expected. But on any conception of volition, its role seems to
lie more in explicating the nature and dynamics of action than in
providing an element essential in analyzing the explanation of
action.
My last point by way of appraisal of Moore's case for positing
volition concerns deviant causal chains. I applaud his unwillingness
to make use of the self-referential approach to this problem
proposed by John Searle.4 ° As Moore notes, putting into the
content of intention elaborate expectations about how one will
perform the intended action renders intentions so complicated as
to make them seem unfamiliar.4 1 Granted, we can reflectively back
into self-ascriptions of such intentions. Recall the case in which a
machine (by evoking appropriate desires and beliefs in me) causes
my hand to rise, and imagine that it rises faster than it usually
would when I am signaling a question.4 2 Asked whether I intended
my hand to rise so fast, I might say I did not intend that, but rather
I intended it to rise in the normal way characteristic of raising it in
order to ask a question. But did I intend just this, or is it that,
although I did not have an intention to raise it fast, I know that I
would have intended to raise it normally if I had considered how to
raise it? Why not say that I have formed a retrospective belief
40 See id. at 143; see also JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY 135-40 (1983)
(discussing the role of deviant causal chains in action and perception).
41 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 145-47.
42 See supra text accompanying note 20.
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attributing a would-be intention, rather than that I have remem-
bered a (subliminal) intention I actually had?
One might reply that surely I at least intended my hand to rise
as a result of my intention to raise it. But one can back into an
attribution of this intention as well, by simply reflecting on how one
normally brings about one's hand's rising, and noting that intention
has causal power in producing that action. Moreover, if this
complicated intention is required for intentional action, what are we
to say of children who are too conceptually undeveloped to have the
concept of intention, yet are clearly capable of intending to raise
their hands?43  Surely the performance of intentional action
precedes the development of the concept of such action; but one
cannot have an intention with a certain content, for example to
raise one's hand as a result of one's intending to raise it, without
having (an understanding of) the concepts figuring essentially in
that content.
When, however, Moore suggests that deviant chains are properly
dealt with simply by taking volitions as proximate causes of
action," I would dissent. One problem is that a volition itself
might be deviantly caused, in which case it is, at least, not clear that
behavior it produces has any claim (based on its genesis in volition)
to be action. Another problem is that there may, for all we know,
be causal intermediaries that normally do intervene between volition
and action; the concept of action does not rule out that possibility.
It does not even clearly rule out the possibility of a psychological
intermediary, such as a process of monitoring the willed move-
ments, as where they are difficult to perform. I hasten to add,
however, that Moore is not alone in offering only a schematic
solution to this deviant chain problem,45 and most of what he
needs to accomplish in the book does not depend on his proposed
solution to the problem of deviant chains.46
43 See AUDI, Acting for Reasons, supra note 2, at 159-60 (defending this sort of
reasoning).
44 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 159-60.
4 5 See, e.g., ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION 61-62 (1970)
(requiring "that action-plans not merely cause basic acts, but that they cause the basic
acts 'in a certain characteristic way'").46 See Audi, supra note 43, at 530-38 (arguing that one need not rely on volition
in developing the solution nor assume that it can play no role in that solution).
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III. THE MULTIFARIOUS CAUSES OF ACTION
As serious as some of the difficulties raised for Moore's
volitionalism may be, his theory of action is, on the whole, a rich
and plausible one whose full resources I do not have space to
canvass here. A better contribution at this point would be to sketch
an alternative approach to the nature and dynamics of action that
seems to solve the sorts of problems he is concerned with more
economically and perhaps more plausibly than his own view. This
Part will concentrate mainly on the dynamics of action.
Let us start with the question of whether volitions can play the
executory role Moore imagines, which is largely a matter of
providing the sorts of event causes of action which a causal theory
demands. Prima facie, they can. We must avoid, of course,
postulating a one-to-one correspondence between volitions and
actions. It is surely not plausible to suppose that for each action I
perform in, say, clipping roses, there is a distinct volition. But as a
number of defenders of volitional theories have pointed out, a
single volition might govern a unified sequence of actions.4 7 If I
know a form in the martial art of tae kwon do well enough, then,
once having decided to do it, I may get lost in the movements until
I have finished. Moreover, there is no reason not to construe some
complicated behavioral sequences, such as playing a musical
passage, as a single basic action performable at will by people
proficient enough.4"
The first question to pursue here is what alternatives there are
to volitions as the event causes of actions. There are at least six
types of variables to be noted. Three are quite common. First,
consider perceptions. Suppose that Mary intends to drop a key down
a stairwell to a person waiting below. She watches it swing back and
"' For discussion of how volitions may correspond to sets of related actions or to
complicated basic ones, see, for example, Alvin I. Goldman, The Volition Theory
Revisited, in ACTION THEORY 67, 71-76 (Myles Brand & Douglas Walton eds., 1976).
4 Not all volitional theorists would be hospitable to extending this notion very far,
however, particularly if volition is strongly associated with the sense of exertion.
Ginet, for example, cautions that
[v]olition is a fluid mental activity whose content is continually changing; at
each moment, it is concerned only with bodily exertion in the immediate
present. I can all at one time decide to swim another length of the pool,
but I cannot all at one time will the whole sequence of bodily exertions
involved in swimming another length, anymore than I can perform that
sequence of exertions all at one time.
CARL GINET, ON ACTION 32-33 (1990).
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forth from the tag to which it is attached, and when she first sees it
come to rest above the waiting hands of the person below, she
releases it. Her perception of the awaited opportunity is what
seems to cause the action (at least in the sense of "cause" appropri-
ate to the perceptual triggering that sets her fingers in motion).
There can be a volition, and perhaps would be if her fingers went
to sleep while she waited, but there need be no such event.
Second, thoughts, such as the thought that in order to save the
coffee from burning one must turn it off right away, can be event
causes of action. Third, decisions, choices, resolutions, and the
like-what we might call executive actions-can apparently play the
appropriate role. Resolving to decline a second helping at the
banquet can cause one's declining, at that time, a piece of bread
one is offered; one might make the resolution at the very moment
one sees the breadbasket approaching. A resolution can also be a
basis on which, later, one's noticing the host's offering one more
piece of bread causes one to reject it almost automatically. The
resolution is a motivational event; the noticing simply connects the
action with antecedent motivation. In both cases, it is motivation
that explains why one does the deed; but it is the relevant event that
triggers one's doing it and explains the timing of the action. It both
sets one in motion and (typically) provides an explanation of why
one acts at the time one does.
Granted, decisions and the like are similar to volitions, but they
are not equivalent to them. For one thing, they are not pervasive
enough, since many actions, like impulsively pushing over a dead
stump on a walk in the country or steering around a puddle that
may splash pedestrians on the sidewalk, occur automatically or so
spontaneously that they are not appropriately traceable to, for
example, decisions. They are, however, intentional and should thus
be under the control of volition. For another thing, unlike
volitions, executive actions are very often comparative (or involve
making a comparison) in a sense that entails the agent's actor
considering more than one option; and even when they are not
explicitly comparative, executive actions typically arise from
considering a prospect or reflecting on what one is to do. In any
event, if volitions ever are equated with any of these, the resulting
theory should be accordingly recast to reflect the diversity of these
elicitors of action, and then assessed in the light of the more
familiar concepts that shape it.
This brings us to the fourth and fifth kinds of nonvolitional
variables that can be event causes of action. Neither is generally
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discussed, but both can straightforwardly cause action. One is a
change in the balance of motivational forces. Suppose I must choose
between two attractive magazines at a newsstand. I may look from
one to the other and, through my desire for one of them simply
becoming the stronger of the two and tipping the motivational scale,
buy that one. To be sure, I could just plump for one of them by an
act of will intended to save me from the fate of Buridan's Ass.
49
But no such intervention need occur in the kind of case in question,
where one may be quite warranted in simply waiting for the
stronger desire to prevail. It is not as if there were any need to
push oneself; here the desire that spontaneously emerges as
stronger may be, for just that reason, the one it is best for me to
follow.
The other, similar, case is the overcoming of inertia. Intending
to leave for home upon seeing that it is dark and approaching
dinner hour, one may still linger in one's chair, simply relaxing after
a long day. After a certain point is reached, presumably as one's
motivation to leave or one's realization that one may be late grows
stronger relative to one's inertia, one may get up. Granted inertia
may arise from a conflicting desire to stay at the office, in which
case we might have an instance of action due to a change in the
balance of motivational forces, but conflicting desire need not be the
source of such inertia. This could be a case in which the flesh is
weak from dead weight, not from inclination or temptation.
In the sixth case, there is no antecedent desire that is, as it were,
waiting to be aroused, nor need there be a thought (at least a
propositional thought-a thought that something is the case, for
example that one must turn off the coffee to save it). Consider
humming a melody that reminds one of a theme from Bach, which
in turn puts before one the image of the chamber music group one
was told is playing tonight. If the prospect of hearing that group
now comes before one's mind, hearing it can become appealing,
and one may suddenly reach for the phone to call for a reservation,
or may say to one's spouse, "Why don't we go hear the chamber
music?" A thought, such as the thought that the chamber group will
be playing, can yield an appealing prospect; but even a prospect
occurring to one in a daydream may have sufficient appeal to
49 That is, caught between two equally attractive piles of hay, the ass was stymied
and died of indecision.
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generate action. Such spontaneous action is both caused and
intentional, but apparently need not arise from volition.
There may certainly be other kinds of events which, though not
entailing volitions, cause actions, but the six kinds indicated cover
a great variety of human actions. It must be granted that not all of
these regularly provide much in the way of explanation. If, for
example, one does not know why Mary dropped the key, saying that
she saw it hanging directly above my hands will not help. However,
the same applies to saying that, for example, she willed to drop it.
In both cases, explanation of the action seems to demand a reason
for it.
If we distinguish between the relations of causing and causally
explaining, however, there is nothing disturbing in these points.
Neither a volition to A nor, for example, perceiving an opportunity
to A is supposed to provide a causal explanation of why Mary A-ed.
But both are closely linked to prima facie causal explanations: the
volition is presumably grounded in the reason(s) explaining the
action, say her wanting to spare me from climbing the stairs and her
believing that dropping the key is necessary to doing so; and the
perception is connected with the reason(s) by virtue of, for instance,
generating a belief that now is a good time, or by indicating an
opportunity to realize the relevant goal, such as getting the key into
my hands. Notice that by and large the nonvolitional event causes
seem to give us more information, for they apparently tell us
something about why the action was appropriate in the circum-
stances. The occurrence of a volition, however, does not imply the
agent's having a conception of a propitious occasion, or a change in
the balance of motivation, or anything else that fits the action into
a rational pattern. The work of volition seems, most commonly, to
be done after these other elements are in place.
What about the subtraction problem or, in Moore's terminology,
the difficulty of distinguishing the "kind, action" from the "kind,
movement"50 or, in other words, of distinguishing voluntary action
from other behavior? This is very difficult to do well on the basis
of any currently available view. Moreover, the notion of voluntary
action is significantly vague. Mere reflexes are clearly ruled out, but
what about things done altogether unknowingly, such as waking a
neighbor by letting one's phone ring too long, or things done
accidentally, such as stepping on a toy? Are the latter simply
50 MOORE, supra note 1, at 134-35.
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nonvoluntary under those descriptions? Whatever the answer, the
intuitive idea, illustrated by the contrast between ordinary intention-
al action and mere reflex behavior, is surely that of being under the
agent's control or, metaphorically, under the control of the will.
Does an action's being under the agent's control require
volition? It apparently need not. If, wanting to get me to take her
car to the shop, Mary drops me the key when it finally lies still
above my hands, she can have perfect control of her releasing it
even if she is thinking about her work when the key finally aligns
with my hand and she then "automatically" releases it. To be sure,
she may have earlier decided to drop it to me to save me from
climbing the several flights; but decision is surely not equivalent to
volition, nor need it recur at or near the time of action, as volition
is normally thought to do. Volition here seems more an aid to
action than a candidate for intending that action or a factor in
choosing it.
Suppose, however, that it could be shown that volition is
necessary for voluntary action. Is its production of action sufficient
for voluntariness? What if my volition is waywardly caused, say by
a fortuitous electrical influence on my brain (or by the work of a
demonic neurophysiologist), and produces an action for which I
have no good reason, and from which I could not abstain by any
amount of resistance? We thus have behavior the agent would not
have willed spontaneously and, in addition, cannot prevent or
control. One might argue that a genuine volition cannot be
waywardly caused; but even if that is not simply an ad hoc restric-
tion, it will render the concept of a volition less clear and less
readily usable in explicating action, since we shall need to under-
stand wayward chains to distinguish volitions from waywardly caused
mental events that seem to be volitions.
In any case, there is apparently still another way in which
wayward chains can raise difficulties. We might start with a
normally generated volition directed toward raising one's arm and
imagine that it waywardly causes the behavior, as where the normal
path between the volition and the arm muscles is blocked, but'the
volition happens to set off an impulse, which in turn activates a
machine, which then gives off a current that, by good fortune,
enters the agent's paralyzed arm and causes it to rise.5 1 This would
51 Lawrence Davis contends that a movement caused by a volition is an action no
matter how wayward the causal chain. See LAWRENCE H. DAVIS, THEORY OF ACTION
38-41 (1979). But the closest he comes to arguing for this is to say that "[s]ince what
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seem to be a mere bodily movement, particularly if (as might well
be the case) its occurrence does not feel to the agent like the
expected action, and probably even if it does. Supposing, however,
that one's feeling as if one is moving one's arm is important for the
question of whether one, in fact, is performing that action, this
need not be owing to the role of volition in action. Both the origin
of this feeling and its importance for the notion of voluntariness
could be explained on alternative theories. In the light of examples
like this, it certainly looks as if volitional causation can explain
voluntariness only in the context of conditions determining whether
the agent controls the relevant behavior. Given an account of those
conditions, it appears that one could also explain voluntariness
without relying on volitions.
The next major domain we must consider is that of the
execution of intentions and, more generally, the behavioral
realization of motivational states, as where S chooses to attend
chamber music over going to a play. It is here that we come to a
different aspect of the executory role that any adequate theory of
action must explain. Let us grant that intentions do not execute
themselves and that a theory of action should say something about
how they are carried out. Surely the sorts of things cited above in
explaining how actions can have nonvolitional event causes can also
explain the execution of intentions. If, plausibly enough, we think
of intentions and other action-explaining motivational states, such
as aims, purposes, and desires, as partly constituted by a tendency
to do things believed necessary for realization of their objects,52 it
is to be expected that certain perceptions, thoughts, decisions, and
changes in the balance of (aroused) motivational forces should be
capable of accounting for the execution of intention and the
realization of other motivational states. For Mary to intend to drop
the key as soon as it is at rest above my hands still is, in part, for her
to be such that, on perceiving, or in some other way coming to
led to the movement [for example, arm rising] was not just any doing but a volition,
an event of the kind crucial to understanding action, we can say that the agent's doing
an A was itself an action." Id. at 21. He adds that "it does not matter what the
object of the volition is." Id. Thus, if one's volition to move my arm moves my leg,
I still act: I move my leg, though unintentionally.
52 For accounts of wanting and intending, see AUDI, Wanting, supra note 2, at 35-
49; AUDI, Intending, supra note 24, at 56-65 (arguing that wants are in part
tendencies to perform actions believed to contribute to achieving the thing wanted
and further arguing that intending implies wanting). If intending implies wanting,
then intending implies not only a tendency to perform the intended action, but a
tendency to perform actions believed to be (say) necessary for doing so.
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believe, that it is in that position, she tends to release it. And to
want something, say to callJoe, is, in part, to be such that if one has
the thought that now is a good time to do so by using the phone
before one, one tends to use it. Similarly, to conclude practical
reasoning with a judgment that one must A is, in part, to be
receptive to perceived opportunities to A (at least if one takes them
to be opportunities), to be responsive to the thought that now is the
time to A, and to be disposed to form an intention to B if it
becomes clear that B-ing is an excellent way to A.
There are at least three important points here. First, such
events as the perceptions and thoughts we have cited have the
appropriate content to connect the action with the intention or
other motivation that explains, and in a sense rationalizes, that
action. Second, such events are among the eliciting conditions in
terms of which one would explicate the nature of the relevant
dispositional states, and hence should be expected to figure in
clarifying the manifestations of those states. Intentions, for
example, are by their very nature manifested in the agent's avowing
and executing them. Wants and beliefs are similarly manifested
both in verbal behavior and in the intentional actions explainable in
terms of them, such as releasing the key in order to get it to
someone waiting to catch it below. As illustrated above, these and
other dispositions are realized by thoughts and perceptions, for
instance the perception of opportunities. Third, there is no reason
to think that the sorts of eliciting events in question are insuf-
ficiently pervasive to account for the execution of all the intentions
whose execution needs explaining. Thought and perception, for
instance, are ubiquitous in our lives. The approach to the dynamics
of action presented in this Part, then, seems to do better than
volitionalism in dealing with the phenomenological problem.
IV. ACTIONS AS RESPONSES TO REASONS
In this Part, I want to outline a more positive view of how action
is best conceived.5 3 Nothing I have said implies that there are no
volitions in any sense or even that volitions do not play a major role
in action. Indeed, surely there are times when it is difficult to avoid
positing acts of will of one kind or another. Consider focusing all
of one's will power on sitting motionless as the dentist drills. "Keep
53 See AUDI, Acting for Reasons, supra note 2 (presenting this view of how best
to conceive action).
VOLITION, INTENTION, AND RESPONSIBILITY
still!" might be one's predominant executive thought. It might be
an expression of strong resolve and accompanied by a determined
attention to clenching one's muscles. And there are times when, in
building determination to do something difficult, one may reach a
point at which one thinks something like "Nowl" and plows forward
as if the command gave one sudden energy. My thesis is not that
action theory does not need volitions in some roles, but rather that
neither a volitional theory of the nature of action nor a volitional
analysis of the concept of action is adequately supported by the
data.
Is any alternative theory more plausible? Let me suggest a
conception of action which, supported by a number of the points
made in Part III, seems preferable. In general terms, we might
think of volitional theories as typically based largely on an executive
thrust model: actions result when one, as it were, directedly moves
oneself so that one's intentions or other motivational states are
activated (or energized) and presumably directed by a volitional
thrust. This model applies whether volitions are conceived as acts
of will, tryings, here-and-now intendings, or in other ways, and
whether actions are volitions under various descriptions or simply
grounded in volitions. There are different kinds of thrusts, with
different kinds of content, and different versions of the model allow
differences in the complexity and temporal extent of the behaviors
traceable to a single volition. In contrast, we might adopt a guidance
and control model: actions result when energy already present in the
motivational structure is released in the appropriate direction by a
suitable eliciting event, such as a thought or decision or a percep-
tion of an opportunity to get what one wants, and guided in that
direction by (above all) the agent's beliefs.
The chief difference between the models concerns the psycho-
logical initiation of action; the models may tend to converge
regarding ongoing actions, for example, concerning how those
actions are explainable by appeal to motivational factors and guided
by beliefs. Still, there is a contrast of overall conception. The
executive thrust model would have us understand action largely by
looking inward for a thrust from below, from the foundations, one
might say, and the real agent seems to be, above all, an inner
executive. The guidance and control model would have us look,
depending on the case, either inward or outward for the kind of
event that, in the agent's situation, releases the energy. If I have
been sitting alone in silence with my eyes closed, we would expect
it to be internal; if I am driving in difficult conditions, we would
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expect it to be my perceiving something.5 4 In both cases, the cue
is internally registered, but its origin may be external. The agent may
exercise power in the interior arena, as where some special resolve
is required to muster determination or overcome fear; but such
internal exercises are not to be expected when the circumstances of
action demand only that one engage the external world as its stimuli
are sorted out, often automatically, when perception supplies them
to the framework constituted by one's beliefs and motivational
dispositions.
According to one version of the thrust model, the execution of
intentions is somewhat like the firing of a rifle by pulling the
trigger. The volition, the triggering, communicates energy which is
then channeled in a definite behavioral direction according to the
content of the volition, and that content, in turn, is expressed in the
direction of the barrel (on some volitional views, the volition may
even supply a measure of explosive energy).5" In the guidance and
control model, the motivational system is more like a compressed
spring; its energy is a function of the strength and number of
relevant conative elements, such as intentions and desires, and its
direction depends on the agent's belief(s) about how the relevant
goal(s) may be achieved. It may take little to release the spring; or,
if it is opposed by another one approximately as strong, will power
may be needed and may be exercised in an interior act or act-like
event-a volition. To be sure, a volitional model can treat volition
more as a releaser of energy than as a contributor of it, but this is
not as common a conception. For instance, viewed as an act of will
or as a trying, volition is conceived as carrying considerable energy.
In any event, because volition has intentional content, it is a more
complex releaser than is required to understand the execution of
intentions, given that the relevant intentions and other attitudes
already have content sufficient to direct the action-in the context
of the same perceptual guidance also required by any plausible
volitional account.
56
54 See Audi, supra note 43, at 545-46 (developing a detailed guidance and control
model). For a different account that also does not require volition, see ALFRED R.
MELE, IRRATIONALITY: AN ESSAY ON AKRASIA, SELF-DECEPTION, AND SELF-CONTROL
31-108 (1987).
" A volitional view may even attribute to the occurrence of volition a measure of
explosive energy.
To be sure, perceiving that, say, the key is over the waiting hands implies
believing this and is thereby intentional; but simply perceiving the waiting hands is
a sufficient trigger, given the standing beliefs and desires the agent already has.
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One advantage of the guidance and control view is that it seems
to do better justice to the automaticity of much of our action: to the
way in which so many of the things we do are unselfconscious
pursuits of our goals and do not require or emerge from delibera-
tion or even a selection of the action in question from among other
options. Often, it is so obvious what to do that we just do it,
without considering either whether to do it or comparing it with
alternatives.5 7 To be sure, a single volition may control a whole
sequence of related actions, but this point alone does little to ease
the way toward volitionalism as a theory implying that every
intentional action is rooted in a volition. For one thing, there are
profound difficulties in determining just how much behavior can be
controlled by a single volition. One difficulty is burgeoning of
content in order to cover complex sequences; another is extended
preservation of the initial thrust, given how much time may be
required for performance. Moreover, there are not only spontane-
ous and automatic actions that do not seem rooted in volition at all,
but also times when activity changes substantially without there being
any reason to think a volitional event occurred. Consider, for
instance, suddenly beginning to talk about a different subject and
to a different person at a party; this can happen almost instanta-
neously.
It is of course arguable that there is a single party-conversation
mode of action that is under the control of a single volition; the
behavior may be quite effectively "scripted.""8 But suppose that,
by routinely accepting an invitation, one simply forms the intention
to attend a party. Then, as one proceeds through the familiar
experience of the party, one has the whole behavioral sequence of
s' As this suggests, automaticity as understood here is quite different from what,
in the law, is called automatism and may not be action at all. For a detailed treatment
of automatism, see ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 71-84 (1991).
58 ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS, AND
UNDERSTANDING 38 (1977) (using the term "script"). It is an interesting empirical
question how much behavior is controllable by a single volition, intention, or other
psychological element: how full a script can be enacted by a single trigger. My view
is neutral on this, as a plausible volitional view may be also, unless it puts too much
detail into the content of volition, so that the limits of the scope of volition cannot
go beyond those of the agent's ability to entertain the relevant details. When Gilbert
Ryle derisively asked how many volitions were required to recite "Little Miss Muffet"
backwards, he was ignoring the point that learning may presumably put a rather long
script under the control of a single volition. See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF
MIND 65 (1949).
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one's conversations guided by standing motivation and beliefs, in
the light of one's perceptions and thoughts. Need one, at any point,
have experienced something plausibly conceived of as willing, for
example, willing to go to the party? And if one does experience a
volition, what is its content? One wonders if it would not have to
be very complex to have the required control of such complex
behavior.
In contrast with volitions, intentions, wants, and beliefs are
dispositional, and they may therefore be unmanifested at least most
of the time during which they exist. As dispositional states, they
need not clutter consciousness, although they can enter it under
appropriate conditions, as where one calls them to mind; and since
they are activated by perceptual and thought events that, on any
plausible theory, are pervasive in human life, it is easier to under-
stand how we can do so much so automatically, if we take the view
that action is, for the most part, motivated, belief-guided behavior
elicited by perceptions, thoughts, decisions, and changes in the
patterns of motivational forces.
In addition to giving a better account than volitionalism of the
automaticity of much of our action, the guidance and control model
is also more economical. It explicates action in terms of concepts
employed on all sides in action theory, and it does so by much more
modest postulations of conscious events than those characteristic of
volitional theories. The latter point is not to be underestimated.
Mental events take up conscious space; only a limited number can
occupy consciousness at a given time. Consciousness may be a
stream, but it is not a river. This is especially so when the content
of consciousness at a given time is actively produced by us, as in
making plans and thereby calling things to mind, and not passively
developed in the way conscious content may arise in response to
external stimuli.
There is, moreover, surely some basis for the point, made by
critics of volitionalism, that phenomenally we are not aware of what
we should be aware of if mental events of volition, under any
plausible description, are as pervasive in action as the theory seems
to say. Granted, if I focus on what I am doing in, say, clipping roses,
I become aware of various feelings, and I can achieve a focal sense of
agency. It does not follow that this awareness of agency was already
there, subliminally or unnoticed. Conscious attention may create,
as well as discover, objects, and it may alter those it might seem
merely to observe. By contrast, at a given time, one can have
indefinitely many intentional dispositions, and even a huge number
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of beliefs and intentions can be causally affecting an agent's
behavior at one time. Their causal work can be done without the
intentional objects of these beliefs and intentions being present in
consciousness, and indeed without any manifestations of them
occurring in consciousness. Thus, one's actions can be controlled
by motivation and cognition even when one's consciousness is
almost wholly occupied with something other than one's motivation-
al or cognitive states or even the objects toward which those states
are directed.
V. VOLITION AND RESPONSIBILITY
In the light of the foregoing assessment of volitionalism, it is
appropriate to ask how the outcome of the debate over volitionalism
may affect the moral and legal theories of responsibility. Moore
and I are both concerned with these theories, although I believe
that his defense of volitionalism has more to do with his views in
action theory than with his commitment to accounting for responsi-
bility. I begin with the free will problem and proceed to some
detailed matters of responsibility.
There may be a tendency to think that volitionalism accords
better with our sense of freedom in action than does any view on
which we do not seem as active, internally, in our day-to-day
behavior. If freedom and determinism are taken to be incompati-
ble, and if volition is taken to be caused only by the agent as
substance and not by antecedent events, this is understandable. But
neither Moore nor I embraces agent causation as an irreducible
category, and both of us are also compatibilists. I cannot see any
advantage to either position on the matter of simply making sense
of human freedom.
When it comes to detailed assignments of responsibility,
however, there may be considerable differences between the
positions. I quoted Moore as noting how important it is in matters
of law to have proximate causes.59 Should this be taken to suggest
that, other things being equal, when behavior stems from volition,
the agent is more responsible for it than when it is, say, inadvertent?
I believe that this may, in fact, be true (other things being equal).
But if it is true, that may be because volition usually implies
intention, which, in turn, implies that the agent's will was directed
toward the action, as it is not directed toward what is done
59 See supra text accompanying note 21.
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inadvertently. I cannot see that mere proximateness of a causal
factor makes it more important in assigning responsibility.
Compare two angry stabbings, one stemming from an impulse
aroused by an insult and immediately yielding action, the other
stemming from a long-standing plan to kill, but immediately
produced by a realization that one has an unexpected good
opportunity. In the latter case, the most important causal fac-
tor-the plan-seems more distant from action and seems to produce
it less "directly," yet the agent would seem (other things being
equal) to bear greater responsibility. I put "directly" in quotes
because it is not clear how proximateness is to be determined, and
one would think that our view of what constitutes the proximate
cause of action will vary with the depth of our psychological
knowledge.6"
One might think that willing something is a kind of endorse-
ment of it. "Is that your will?" we may ask when we wonder whether
someone really means to do something, or to have it done, and
where we take a positive answer to imply that the agent stands
behind the action. If this endorsement view of volition is correct, it
would give volition a special role in responsibility. But surely
volition can occur where one is simply trying to overcome resis-
tance, or to move a limb that has gone to sleep; one may be in the
midst of something trivial and certainly need not consider its merits
or give it the imprimatur of the will. Volition may well reflect an
endorsement; it may indeed be appropriate to an endorsement, as
a way of starting to move from words to deeds. But volition neither
entails nor is entailed by endorsement.
Endorsement of an action by the will is, of course, not a
necessary condition for the agent's bearing moral or legal responsi-
bility for it. Its absence need not even be mitigatory. Neither, I
suggest, is the absence of volition. Granting that my willing
something, as opposed to my doing it merely out of habit, may
enhance my consciousness of what I am doing and, perhaps for that
reason, increase my responsibility for it. Still, the absence of
volition (as the kind of event plausibly identified with a here-and-
6 Robert Schopp has raised the further problem of whether the relevant notion
of proximateness is normatively neutral or instead determined in part by what one
takes as a suitable basis for ascribing liability. See SCHOPP, supra note 57, at 119-20.
I am assuming in the text that there is a neutral notion available, but I do question
how much bearing it has on the determination of moral responsibility.
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now intention) is not excusatory and not, in general, even mitiga-
tory.
In one respect, volition may be less indicative of a person's will
than long-standing intentions. A volition, as an act of will, indicates
the momentary direction of the will. But it is one's intentions that,
collectively, indicate the content of one's will.6" We are people of
good will or ill will because of our overall intentions (or, at least,
our intentions together with desires having the potential to yield
intentions), not because of any single momentary one. If, in fact,
a volition should occur because momentary, passional impulses
overcome long-standing intentions (as may happen in cases of
weakness of will), we speak of acting out of character.
The notion of acting out of character brings us to a further
point. Surely character is very largely a matter of long-standing,
stable desires and beliefs. For instance, desires to treat people
justly, beliefs that other people are like oneself in needs and
sensitivity to abuse, desires to be loved by God, and so forth are
stable. 2 These desires and beliefs do much to explain why people
have the long-standing intentions they do have. If those intentions
indicate the content of the will, the deeper desires and the related
beliefs about fundamental matters in life seem to indicate much
about the structure of the will. Thus, insofar as moral and legal
responsibility concern good will or ill will as manifested in action,
or as conditions relevant to how to punish, the guidance and control
model I have introduced can clarify responsibility in terms deeper
than those of volition. This is not to deny that Moore can use the
same resources. The point is that these are the main resources we
have in action theory; even if we give volitions a special role, we
must still, in appraising people and their actions, look at the long-
standing intentions, desires, and beliefs which form the background
against which volitions-if they are in character-are formed.
CONCLUSION
Overall, then, I find volitionalism as an account of the nature of
action insufficiently supported by the data. But it is a serious
theory that forces us to confront problems easily ignored by causal
theorists who presuppose that desires, beliefs, and intentions simply
yield action without further ado. It also focuses our attention on
61 See AUDI, supra note 38, at 60-63 (interpreting Kant's conception of good will).
62 , of course, include desires that are component in intentions.
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volitions, which until recently have been neglected despite being an
important element in providing a comprehensive picture of human
action. Moore has contributed to clarifying and extending volition-
alism. I share his major aims in that venture. I simply propose to
accomplish those aims without positing so much conscious activity
and so many conscious events. The theory of action has enough raw
materials apart from volition to account for the data that seem
explainable only by positing volitions. Volitions do have a role in
understanding action; but nature does not seem to have made
volition as pervasive as its proponents believe, and most of the jobs
volitions are supposed to do in the dynamics of action are apparent-
ly done by thoughts, perceptions, and other events to which
volitional theories and their competitors are already committed.
Action is under the control of reasons. It is guided by thoughts,
perceptions, and other natural events. And it is explainable by
reference to the psychological framework in which the basic ends of
our behavior are contained in our desires and intentions, and its
basic direction is determined by our beliefs.
